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O P I N I ON  
   
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
Under Section 32 of the Securities Exchange Act, a 
defendant who violates a Security and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) rule or regulation but proves that he “had no 
knowledge of such rule or regulation” is not subject to 
imprisonment.1  The rule is intended to protect laypersons 
                                                 
1 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).   
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who commit technical violations.2  This case requires us to 
determine the precise burden on a defendant who wishes to 
use the so-called “non-imprisonment defense.”  We hold that 
a defendant can establish lack of knowledge and avoid 
imprisonment if he demonstrates, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that he did not know the substance of the rule or 
regulation that he violated.  Because appellant Steven Fishoff 
did not establish a lack of knowledge of the rule that he pled 
guilty to violating and because his other procedural 
arguments fail, we will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court.   
 
I 
Fishoff began trading securities in the early 1990s.  He 
was a skilled trader and eventually quit his job in the clothing 
manufacturing sector to trade full-time.  He initially traded in 
partnership with a “backer,” i.e., an investor who provided the 
capital for his trading activity.  By 2009, he had earned 
enough money to set up his own firm, Featherwood Capital, 
Inc.  At Featherwood, he had one full-time employee and also 
worked with several independent contractors.  He controlled 
accounts that yielded profits between $2 and $5 million per 
year.  Despite his successes, Fishoff neither had any formal 
training in nor took any courses on the securities markets, 
regulations, or compliance.  Nor did he ever hold a securities 
or other professional license.  He operated Featherwood 
without any expert legal or regulatory advice.   
                                                 
2 See United States v. Lilley, 291 F. Supp. 989, 992 (S.D. Tex. 
1968) (citing Report of the Joint Conference Committee, 78 
Cong. Rec. 10263 (1934)); see also 78 Cong. Rec. 8295-96 
(1934) (statement of Sen. Steiwer).   
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One of Fishoff’s practices was short-selling a 
company’s stock in anticipation of the company making a 
secondary offering.  Short-selling is the sale of a security that 
the seller has borrowed with the belief that the price of the 
security will drop.  This enables the seller to make a profit by 
buying back the stock at a lower price before returning it.  
Secondary offerings, i.e., when a public company issues and 
sells new shares to raise money, can cause the company’s 
share price to decrease because the new shares dilute the 
value of existing shares.  Not surprisingly, many traders and 
market researchers try to predict when a company will make a 
secondary offering by, for example, forecasting when a 
company will need an influx of cash.  In order to make such a 
forecast, a trader will use public financial disclosures or 
watch for updated shelf registration statements.3   
 
Although secondary offerings are confidential, a 
company, through its underwriter, may contact potential 
buyers to assess interest in the offering.  Different investment 
banks, acting as underwriters, take different approaches in 
authorizing their salespeople to describe the subject company 
and its market capitalization.  However, when a salesperson 
provides confidential information, such as the name of the 
                                                 
3 Short-selling can artificially depress a stock’s price.  To 
ensure that secondary offerings reflect market forces, the SEC 
issued Rule 105 of Regulation M, 17 C.F.R. § 242.105, which 
generally prohibits the purchase of securities in secondary 
offerings if the purchaser engaged in short-selling of that 
stock within a five-day period before the offering.  Although 
Rule 105 is not at issue here, it is the subject of certain claims 
in a related SEC case.  SEC v. Fishoff, No. 13-cv-3725-MAS-
DEA (D.N.J.) (filed June 3, 2015).   
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issuing company and the pricing and timing of the offering, 
the recipient of this information is considered to be “over the 
wall” or “OTW” and is barred by relevant law, including the 
SEC’s Rule 10b-5-2, from trading the issuer’s securities or 
disclosing the information to anyone else before the offering 
is publicly announced.  Otherwise, the recipient will have an 
unfair advantage and be able to profit from the inside 
information, for example by short-selling the stock and 
repurchasing it after the announcement of the secondary 
offering, assuming the price has indeed dropped.   
 
The criminal insider trading activity at issue in this 
case relates to Featherwood’s practice of receiving 
confidential information about impending secondary 
offerings, i.e. being brought over the wall, and short-selling 
based on that inside information.  Two of Fishoff’s associates, 
Ronald Chernin and Steven Constantin, opened accounts at 
investment banking firms and cultivated relationships with 
investment bankers in order to receive solicitations to invest 
in secondary offerings.  Chernin and Constantin learned about 
specific secondary offerings from the investment banks and 
agreed to keep the information confidential.  They then 
telephoned Fishoff and told him they were “OTW” and had 
learned when a certain company was planning a secondary 
offering.  Fishoff would short-sell the company’s shares, later 
profiting by purchasing the shares after the announcement of 
the secondary offering, when the price had fallen.  Fishoff 
also shared the inside information with Paul Petrello, a long-
time business associate, personal friend, and former colleague 
at Worldwide Capital, one of Fishoff’s early backers.  Petrello 
similarly used the inside information to short-sell, and he and 
Fishoff split the trading profits.  Petrello testified at his own 
plea hearing that Fishoff would send the first two letters of 
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the company’s stock trading symbol by text message and then 
tell him the last two letters by phone.4   
 
In November 2015, Fishoff was charged in a five-
count Indictment including one count of conspiracy to 
commit securities fraud and four separate counts of securities 
fraud.  He eventually pled guilty to Count 4, securities fraud 
in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78ff, 17 C.F.R. § 
240.10b-5 (Rule 10b-5), and 18 U.S.C. § 2.  His plea related 
to the trading of stock in Synergy Pharmaceuticals, Inc.  As 
described in the plea agreement, in the government’s 
sentencing memorandum, and at the plea hearing, Chernin 
was solicited by phone to participate in Synergy’s 
confidentially marketed secondary offering and brought over 
the wall on April 30, 2012.  He called Fishoff a few minutes 
later.  Featherwood started short-selling Synergy stock later 
the same morning via Fishoff’s online trading account.  The 
secondary offering was publicly announced on May 3, 2012.  
                                                 
4 The government in its brief refers to Fishoff’s use of “coded 
language” to pass along the confidential information to 
others.  The government cites to the portion of the sentencing 
hearing transcript where the prosecution discussed Fishoff’s 
and Petrello’s use of coded language, including the 
transmittal of stock symbols in fragments.  Fishoff objected at 
the sentencing hearing that Petrello’s plea was not part of the 
record.  However, because Fishoff did not object in his reply 
brief to the government’s mention of the same evidence (and 
in fact refers to Petrello’s testimony on other issues), he has 
waived any objection to our consideration of that evidence.  
See United States v. Shaw, 891 F.3d 441, 455 n.17 (3d Cir. 
2018); Suarez-Valenzuela v. Holder, 714 F.3d 241, 248-49 
(4th Cir. 2013).   
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Fishoff stipulated that he and his associates made between 
$1.5 and $3.5 million by short-selling Synergy stock based on 
the confidential information regarding the upcoming 
secondary offering.  Fishoff also stipulated that he had 
breached the duty of confidentiality and trust owed to the 
source of the inside information and agreed that he had done 
so “willfully.”5  
 
Fishoff’s sentencing took place on November 5, 2018.  
In his sentencing memorandum, Fishoff claimed that he had 
no knowledge of SEC Rule 10b5-2 and was entitled to the 
affirmative defense against imprisonment pursuant to Section 
32 of the Securities Exchange Act.  The government, in its 
sentencing memorandum, requested a sentence within the 
Guidelines range of 46 to 57 months.  At the sentencing 
hearing, the court asked whether the parties had non-
Guidelines objections to the Pre-Sentence Report.  Fishoff’s 
attorney clarified that the court was not referring to the 
affirmative defense of Section 32, and the court agreed and 
said it would hear about that “separate[ly].”6  The court 
proceeded to calculate the Guidelines range of Fishoff’s 
sentence, denied Fishoff’s request for a departure, and heard 
Fishoff’s allocution.  The court also heard argument from 
Fishoff’s counsel that a sentence of home confinement would 
be appropriate.  Following a break, the court asked the parties 
if there were any clarifications for the record.  Hearing none, 
the court proceeded to discuss the factors it needed to 
consider under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), granted a variance 
downward, and sentenced Fishoff to 30 months’ 
imprisonment.  The government then moved to dismiss the 
                                                 
5 S.A. 21 (Plea Hearing Tr. 21:11-12). 
6 A131.   
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remaining counts, which the Court granted.   
 
After the District Court announced the sentence and 
dismissed the remaining counts, Fishoff’s attorney reminded 
the court that it had not addressed its Section 32 argument on 
the non-imprisonment defense.  The court responded that it 
had “addressed all of the steps necessary for sentencing,” and 
when Fishoff’s attorney responded with an explanation of the 
affirmative defense and pointed to the relevant portion of the 
sentencing submission, the court stated for the record that 
“[a]ny motion pursuant to Section 32 of the Securities 
Exchange Act prohibiting imprisonment is hereby denied in 
its entirety.”7  Fishoff did not object.  The next day, on 
November 6, the court issued a written order “for the sake of 
clarity” explaining that Fishoff had failed to establish that he 
was a layperson and failed to present evidence supporting his 
argument that he lacked knowledge of Rule 10b5-2.8   
                                                 
7 A184.   
8 A18.  Rule 10b5-2 sets forth “a non-exclusive definition of 
circumstances” in which the misappropriation theory of Rule 
10b-5 would apply.  Under that theory, the defendant is not an 
insider but an outsider who possesses inside information and 
owes a fiduciary duty to the source.  Rule 10b5-2, which the 
SEC promulgated in 2000 to codify the Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. O’Hagan, provides guidance on 
such cases.  United States v. McPhail, 831 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 
2016) (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 
(1997)).  Fishoff refers to Rule 10b5-2 in his briefs, as does 
the District Court in its order, while the government refers to 
Rule 10b-5.  Section 78ff(a) makes clear that a defendant 
must demonstrate a lack of knowledge of the rule he violated 
in order to avail himself of the affirmative defense.  Because 
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This appeal followed.  Fishoff raises three main 
arguments.  First, he argues that the District Court violated 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 by failing to make 
factual findings at sentencing and improperly curtailing his 
argument on the affirmative defense.  Second, he argues that 
the government may not oppose his request on appeal because 
it was silent with respect to the affirmative defense in the 
course of the proceedings below.  Third, he urges us to 
overturn the District Court’s ruling that he did not 
demonstrate a lack of knowledge of the rule he violated.  We 
discuss each in turn. 
                                                                                                             
Fishoff pled guilty to violating Rule 10b-5, the relevant rule 
in this case is Rule 10b-5.  In any event, Rule 10b5-2 does not 
stand alone as a source of liability; as a special case of insider 
trading, it assumes the other relevant elements of that charge 
are present.  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(a) (“This section 
shall apply to any violation of . . . § 240.10b-5 . . . .”); see 
also United States v. Knueppel, 293 F. Supp. 2d 199, 204 
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Whether or not defendants knew that they 
faced potential prosecution under a theory labeled by lawyers 
as the ‘misappropriation theory,’ they pled guilty to 
[conspiracy to commit securities fraud].”).  For that reason, 
defendants in misappropriation cases are simply charged with 
violating Rule 10b-5, e.g., United States v. Parigian, 824 F.3d 
5, 8 (1st Cir. 2016), or sometimes both Rule 10b-5 and Rule 
10b5-2, e.g., United States v. Gansman, 657 F.3d 85, 90 (2d 
Cir. 2011).  To the extent that Fishoff believed he needed to 
demonstrate only a lack of knowledge of the misappropriation 
theory, he was mistaken, and to the extent that the District 
Court erred in this regard, any error is harmless.   
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II9 
A 
We first address Fishoff’s argument that the District 
Court violated Rule 32.  The purpose of Rule 32 is “threefold:  
(1) to allow the defendant to present mitigating 
circumstances, (2) to permit the defendant to present personal 
characteristics to enable the sentencing court to craft an 
individualized sentence, and (3) to preserve the appearance of 
fairness in the criminal justice system.”10   
 
Fishoff relies on two separate subsections of this rule.  
First, Fishoff argues that the District Court failed to make 
factual findings on the record in violation of Rule 32(i)(3)(B), 
which requires the sentencing court, “for any . . . controverted 
matter,” to “rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling is 
unnecessary either because the matter will not affect 
sentencing, or because the court will not consider the matter 
in sentencing.”  The rule is “strictly enforced” and requires 
the court to make express findings on disputed facts or to 
disclaim reliance upon disputed facts.11   
 
Here, the District Court did not violate Rule 
                                                 
9 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3231.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1291 
and 3742(a).   
10 United States v. Moreno, 809 F.3d 766, 777 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
11 United States v. Electrodyne Sys. Corp., 147 F.3d 250, 255 
(3d Cir. 1998). 
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32(i)(3)(B) by failing to rule on the affirmative defense.12  
First of all, the Court did issue a clear ruling in response to 
Fishoff’s objection,13 unlike in United States v. Electrodyne 
Systems Corp., cited by Fishoff, where the record was “[a]t 
best . . . ambiguous as to the district court’s reliance upon the 
disputed matters.”14  Fishoff also relies on United States v. 
Metro, but in that case, the court did not resolve a dispute 
about the defendant’s role in the scheme because it 
mistakenly considered the factual dispute to be moot, when it 
was in fact “very much alive.”15  Here, the Court made no 
                                                 
12 Our review of the District Court’s adherence to Rule 32 is 
plenary.  United States v. Ward, 732 F.3d 175, 180 n.4 (3d 
Cir. 2013).  The government urges us to apply plain error 
review.  We are not persuaded.  The government relies on 
United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 257 (3d Cir. 
2014), in which we held that a defendant must raise any 
procedural objection to his sentence (such as a court’s failure 
to give meaningful consideration to the defendant’s 
substantive argument) after the sentence is pronounced.  In 
that case, the parties argued for and against a variance but the 
court did not rule on it.  The court then announced its 
sentence, at which point defense counsel did not object to the 
court’s failure to rule on the variance issue.  Here, the District 
Court announced its sentence, Fishoff objected that the court 
had not addressed Section 32, and the court ruled on the 
objection.  In this manner, then, the court ruled on the 
affirmative defense.   
13 A184 (“Any motion pursuant to Section 32 of the 
Securities Exchange Act prohibiting imprisonment is hereby 
denied in its entirety.”).  
14 147 F.3d 250, 255 (3d Cir. 1998).   
15 882 F.3d 431, 442 (3d Cir. 2018). 
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such mistake.   
 
Moreover, to the extent the Rule requires express 
findings on the viability of the affirmative defense, we find a 
clear statement of the court’s findings in its rejection of the 
defense.  As the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. 
Laurienti, by rejecting the affirmative defense without 
providing specific reasons, the court “necessarily found he 
knew of the [SEC] rule” he was charged with violating.16  
Finally, even if there was error, it is evident from the court’s 
November 6 ruling that any further explanation on the part of 
the court would not have changed the sentence it imposed.  
Thus, any error is harmless.  
 
Second, Fishoff argues that the District Court 
improperly curtailed his argument on the affirmative non-
imprisonment defense at sentencing in violation of Rule 
32(i)(4)(A).  That subsection requires the court, “[b]efore 
imposing sentence,” to “provide the defendant’s attorney an 
opportunity to speak on the defendant’s behalf” and “address 
                                                 
16 731 F.3d 967, 972 (9th Cir. 2013); see also United States v. 
Campbell, 295 F.3d 398, 406 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that the 
district court fulfilled its obligation to make factual findings 
on controverted matters by stating that the disputed portions 
of the presentence report were supported by a preponderance 
of the evidence); cf. United States v. Zehrung, 714 F.3d 628, 
632 (1st Cir. 2013) (sentencing court may “implicitly” resolve 
factual disputes when its statements and the sentence “show[] 
that the facts were decided in a particular way” as long as 
both the findings and the basis for the findings are clear 
enough “to permit effective appellate review” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).   
13 
 
the defendant personally in order to permit the defendant to 
speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence.”   
 
We see no plain error violation of this subsection of 
Rule 32.17  As an initial matter, the sentencing court “has 
always retained the discretion to place certain restrictions on 
what may be presented during an allocution.”18  Here, Fishoff 
submitted an extensive sentencing memorandum, which 
included a section on the non-imprisonment defense, as well 
as 38 letters of support, a DVD, and a letter from Fishoff.  At 
the hearing, the court heard lengthy arguments from Fishoff’s 
counsel, who at several points requested a sentence of home 
confinement.  The court addressed Fishoff personally and 
Fishoff himself spoke at length.  This case is unlike those 
relied upon by Fishoff, such as United States v. Chapman, 
where the district court refused a continuance so that the 
defendant, who had mistakenly not been notified of the day of 
sentencing, could gather letters from family members and 
prepare for allocution.19  This case is also unlike those in 
which we have found error because the sentencing court 
infringed on the right of the defendant to allocute.20  Finally, 
                                                 
17 Fishoff did not object at sentencing that the court was 
interfering with his right to present information.  We thus 
review for plain error only.  Moreno, 809 F.3d at 777.  
18 Ward, 732 F.3d at 182; see also U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3 cmt. 
(“When a dispute exists about any factor important to the 
sentencing determination, the court must ensure that the 
parties have an adequate opportunity to present relevant 
information.  Written statements of counsel or affidavits of 
witnesses may be adequate under many circumstances.”).   
19 915 F.3d 139, 144-47 (3d Cir. 2019). 
20 E.g., Moreno, 809 F.3d 766. 
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it is clear from the November 6 order that oral argument on 
the affirmative defense would not have made a difference in 
Fishoff’s sentence.  Thus, any error did not affect his 
substantial rights.21 
 
We do not condone the practice of telling defense 
counsel that they will be permitted to argue for an affirmative 
defense at sentencing and then denying the defense without 
oral argument.  Nevertheless, Fishoff was able to present his 
defense adequately, and the court’s ruling on it was sufficient.  
Furthermore, as discussed below,22 Fishoff’s arguments that 
he was entitled to the defense are not persuasive.  For those 
reasons we hold that the court did not violate Rule 32. 
 
B 
We next address Fishoff’s argument that the 
government was silent in the face of his affirmative defense 
below and therefore should, on appeal, not be permitted to 
argue against it.  Fishoff points out that the government 
responded to other portions of his sentencing memorandum, 
thereby demonstrating “that it was fully capable of advising” 
the court on matters affecting sentencing, but that it failed to 
do so with respect to his affirmative non-imprisonment 
defense.  His argument fails for two reasons.   
 
 First, by requesting a sentence of imprisonment within 
the Guidelines range of 46 to 57 months, the government was 
necessarily opposing Fishoff’s argument that he should not be 
sentenced to prison.  As the government points out, it 
                                                 
21 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). 
22 Infra Part II.C. 
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submitted its sentencing memorandum before Fishoff 
submitted his; the court did not require or permit 
supplemental briefing before sentencing, merely the filing of 
supplemental documents.  Nor did the court elicit the 
government’s views on the matter at sentencing.  To be sure, 
the government could have volunteered its position at the 
hearing.  But even if the government did not provide its 
explicit view on the matter, its request for a sentence of 
imprisonment clearly demonstrated its position—that Fishoff 
was not entitled to the defense.23   
 
 Second, as other circuits have made clear, when a 
criminal defendant appeals, the government is “tasked, in 
effect, with defending the district court’s judgment.”24  This 
is so even when the government agreed to a sentencing 
adjustment that the district court did not award.25  Although 
we have not addressed this exact issue, we held in United 
States v. Griswold that the government may defend the 
                                                 
23 The cases cited by Fishoff do not require a contrary result.  
In United States v. Weatherspoon, 696 F.3d 416, 421-22 (3d 
Cir. 2012), we held that the government was barred from 
arguing for the first time on appeal that a defendant could not 
file a second motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  
Here, by contrast, the government necessarily opposed the 
motion.  The second case, United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 
152 (3d Cir. 2010), is distinguishable because the government 
in that case took a position on appeal that contradicted several 
express statements it made below.  There were no such 
express statements here. 
24 United States v. Carbajal-Valdez, 874 F.3d 778, 786 (1st 
Cir. 2017).   
25 Huff v. United States, 734 F.3d 600, 610 (6th Cir. 2013). 
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district court’s factual finding with respect to a defendant’s 
offense level even if the government stipulated to contrary 
facts in the plea negotiation.26  Here, the plea agreement 
explicitly reserved the government’s right (and Fishoff’s 
right) to take any position on appeal.27  Moreover, the 
government never agreed that the non-imprisonment defense 
applied.     
 
 For these reasons, Fishoff’s preclusion argument lacks 
merit.   
C 
We turn, last, to Fishoff’s argument that the District 
Court erred in finding that he did not meet his burden of 
demonstrating a lack of knowledge of the substantive SEC 
Rule he pled guilty to violating.  We review the District 
Court’s factual findings for clear error.28  In doing so, we do 
not find clear error simply because “there are two permissible 
views of the evidence.”29  
 
We have not previously had occasion to interpret the 
non-imprisonment defense of Section 32.  Other circuits have 
done so and we find their analyses helpful, especially the 
                                                 
26 57 F.3d 291, 298-99 (3d Cir. 1995). 
27 Except that neither side could argue on appeal that the 
sentencing court erred in accepting the factual stipulations.   
28 United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 561 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(en banc). 
29 Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574 
(1985). 
17 
 
reasoning of the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Behrens.30  
In that case, the Eighth Circuit rejected the defendant’s view 
that the non-imprisonment defense is available to one who 
shows that he did not know that the rule in question applied to 
his conduct (even if he was aware of the rule).31  The court 
also rejected the government’s view that the non-
imprisonment defense is only available to a defendant who 
can show “a complete absence of knowledge” of the rule’s 
“very existence.”32  The court instead drew a middle line, 
based on the plain language of the statute, and held that 
defendants must show by a preponderance of the evidence 
“that they did not know the substance of the SEC rule or 
regulation they allegedly violated, regardless of whether they 
understood its particular application to their conduct.”33  By 
requiring the defendant to demonstrate a lack of knowledge of 
the substance of the rule, the defense marks only a minor 
departure from the traditional principle that ignorance of the 
law is no excuse.34 
                                                 
30 713 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2013). 
31 The Eighth Circuit found that such an interpretation would 
create a specific intent mens rea more appropriate for, e.g., 
criminal tax cases, which run a higher risk of “convicting 
individuals engaged in apparently innocent activity.”  Id. at 
931 (quoting Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 195 
(1998)).  
32 713 F.3d at 929. 
33 Id. at 930, 932.   
34 Id. at 931 (“This rule protects from imprisonment 
individuals who truly are unaware of the substance of an SEC 
rule or regulation, but it does not go so far as to completely 
vitiate the principle that ignorance of the law is no defense.”); 
id. at 931-32 (“The purpose of the no-knowledge provision is 
18 
 
We agree with the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in 
Behrens that a defendant who wishes to qualify for the non-
imprisonment defense must demonstrate, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that he did not know the substance of the rule 
that he violated.  It is immaterial that a defendant does not 
know the exact number of the rule, and immaterial that the 
defendant did not specifically intend to violate the rule.35 
 
Applying this construction of the defense to the case 
before us, we find that Fishoff did not meet his burden.  He 
offers four main pieces of evidence. 
 
First, he maintains that “there can be no presumption 
that [he] would generally have knowledge of the SEC’s 
technical rules,” and that “[n]o layperson would generally 
know of Rule 10b5-2.”36  But Fishoff was a full-time trader 
who made his living by trading stocks.  Even assuming a true 
layperson would not be aware that insider trading is 
prohibited, which is a dubious proposition, we cannot credit 
his claim to be a layperson.  He was an experienced trader 
                                                                                                             
certainly to ‘soften[] the impact of the common-law 
presumption’ that ‘mistake of law is no defense’ . . . .” 
(quoting Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199, (1991)) 
(alterations in original)).   
35 Cf. Lilley, 291 F. Supp. at 993 (holding that it is irrelevant 
that the defendant does not know “the precise number or 
common name of the rule, the book and page where it was to 
be found, or the date upon which it was promulgated”). 
36 As explained above, the rule in question is the rule to which 
Fishoff pled guilty to violating, which here is Rule 10b-5 and 
not the rule setting forth the misappropriation theory (Rule 
10b5-2).  See supra n.8. 
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with years in the business.  He had performed hundreds of 
thousands of trades.37  We recognize that the illicit trades 
constituted a tiny fraction of the trades completed by 
Featherwood.  But the sheer volume of normal, non-violative 
trading activity carried out or overseen by Fishoff merely 
throws into sharper relief the few trades that relied on 
confidential inside information.  Based on his trading activity, 
Fishoff cannot plausibly claim, without more, that he was not 
a professional trader.  Thus, he does not benefit from any 
presumption that he was unaware of insider trading rules.  
  
Second, Fishoff points out that he has never held a 
securities license, worked as a registered broker/dealer, 
studied for any securities licensing exam, or received training 
in the securities laws.  This evidence is an extension of his 
claimed non-professional status.  We find it unpersuasive for 
the same reasons.  His lack of licensure or training carries less 
weight in light of the fact that he made his living by trading 
securities; it is implausible that a professional trader like 
Fishoff would not know about Rule 10b-5.38  We find no 
clear error in the District Court’s decision that this evidence 
does not meet the preponderance standard.   
 
Third, Fishoff refers to the emails he and his associates 
                                                 
37 United States v. D’Honau, 459 F.2d 73, 75 (9th Cir. 1972) 
(“Appellant was experienced in the stock market; it is a 
remote possibility that he did not know the actions prohibited 
by 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 were contrary to law.”).   
38 Other courts have similarly denied the defense to 
individuals who claimed not to have “academic” or 
“professional” experience.  See Knueppel, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 
204-05.  
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received from investment banks containing form 
confidentiality agreements and points out that these emails do 
not mention Rule 10b-5.  This argument is meritless.  The 
emails clearly stated that they contained confidential 
information, the use of which was restricted.  If anything, 
these form confidentiality agreements should have been red 
flags for Fishoff that he was not permitted to trade based on 
the confidential information.  They certainly do not 
demonstrate his lack of knowledge, much less meet the 
preponderance standard. 
 
Fourth, Fishoff points out that he became aware of 
Rule 10539 in September 2013, after the SEC brought a case 
against 23 individuals based on that rule.  The head of 
Featherwood’s introducing broker, Montecito, sent Fishoff 
copies of Rule 105 and Reg SHO on October 2, 2013 (over 
one year after the Synergy trades described in Count 4).  
Once he became aware of Rule 105, he realized some of his 
short-selling had violated that rule and took efforts to ensure 
future compliance by directing his associates to stop short-
selling after being solicited by underwriters.  But Rule 105 is 
not at issue here.  Fishoff claims that he did not know that the 
government would consider the short-selling to violate Rule 
10b-5 in addition to violating Rule 105, but that is not enough 
to qualify for the defense.40  The fact that he learned of Rule 
105, realized the SEC was able to enforce it, and sought to 
avoid such enforcement of that rule does not demonstrate that 
he did not know of Rule 10b-5.  The best inference one could 
draw from this evidence is that Fishoff lacked knowledge of 
                                                 
39 17 C.F.R. § 242.105, “Short selling in connection with a 
public offering.” 
40 Behrens, 713 F.3d at 929-30. 
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the substance of Rule 105 before October 2013.  But neither 
his lack of knowledge of Rule 105 nor his attempts to avoid a 
Rule 105 enforcement action have any bearing on his 
knowledge of a separate rule.   
 
In short, none of Fishoff’s proffered evidence 
demonstrates his lack of knowledge by a preponderance of 
the evidence.  In addition, there is enough countervailing 
evidence on the other side of the equation to conclude that the 
District Court did not clearly err.  First, there is the fact that 
he was an experienced professional, discussed above.  
Second, the government points out that Fishoff told his 
associates to notify him of the confidential information by 
phone and conveyed the same information to Petrello using a 
code.  Fishoff does not dispute the government’s 
characterization of these communications.  His attempts to 
conceal the scheme suggests that he was aware that it was 
wrong and could support an inference that he knew of a 
prohibition against trading on the confidential information.41  
Finally, his reluctance to hire compliance personnel, despite 
advice from friends who were securities professionals, 
indicates that on some level Fishoff was aware he was 
violating a securities rule—or at least risking a violation of a 
securities rule and choosing to disregard that risk.   
 
In sum, we hold that the District Court did not err in 
ruling that Fishoff did not establish by a preponderance of the 
                                                 
41 United States v. Reyes, 577 F.3d 1069, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 
2009) (based on evidence of “conceal[ment]” and “directing 
employees to not communicate . . . over the phone or email,” 
the district court appropriately found that the defendant had 
not met her burden of establishing lack of knowledge). 
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evidence a lack of knowledge of Rule 10b-5. 
 
III 
 We will affirm the judgment of sentence of the District 
Court. 
